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RECENT DECISIONS
result complained of and without which the result would not have
occurred.3
As a matter of law, the defendant had the right of way 4 for
"Every driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall grant the
right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from his
right".5 Irrespective of traffic and police regulations, a driver of a
vehicle turning across traffic must use care commensurate with the
situation and look out for approaching cars, but he is not obliged to
wait until all in sight have passed. Others have the duty of exercising
like reasonable care so as not to collide with the turning car.6 How-
ever, one is not bound to use the highest degree of care.7
According to the Guest Rule, a passenger may recover for
injuries received in a collision between two automobiles even though
both drivers were at fault.8  However, to allow recovery against the
defendant, the negligence of the defendant must be the direct and
proximate cause of the injury.9 In the instant case, had the jury
found that the negligence of the defendant was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff's injuries, the latter would not have been denied a recov-
ery even if both drivers were at fault.
R.D.
NEGLIGENCE-BAILMENT-SECTION 59 OF THE MOTOR VEHICLE
LAW CONSTRUED.-The Forbes Motor Agency Inc., an automobile
selling agency, delivered one of its cars to the defendant Brown and
Kleinhenz Inc., for the purpose of effecting a sale. The Forbes
Agency vested control of the car in the defendant without limitation
of authority and also knew that dealers in general, and the Brown
'45 C. J. 898; Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 56 N. E. 679 (1899).
'Robinson v. Insurance Co. of North America, 198 N. Y. 523, 91 N. E.
373 (1910) ; Thomas v. Union Ry., 18 App. Div. 185, 45 N. Y. Supp. 920 (2d
Dept. 1897); Hurley v. Olcott, 134 App. Div. 631, 119 N. Y. Supp. 430 (2d
Dept. 1909); Bresslin v. Star Co., 166 App. Div. 89, 151 N. Y. Supp. 660
(2d Dept. 1915) ; Zvonik v. Interurban St. Ry., 88 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1904).
rVERICLE AND TRAFFic LAW §82, subd. 4 (Cons. Laws c. 71); Traffic
Regulations promulgated by the Police Dept. art. 2, § 6.
'Farr v. Wright, 248 App. Div. 48, 289 N. Y. Supp. 399 (3d Dept. 1936).
1 Zvonik v. Interurban St. Ry., 88 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1904).
'Michelson v. Stuhlman, 272 N. Y. 163, 5 N. E. (2d) 185 (1936); Prindle
v. Rockland Transit Corp., 271 N. Y. 580, 3 N. E. (2d) 194 (1936); Burd v.
Bleischer, 208 App. Div. 499, 203 N. Y. Supp. 754 (4th Dept. 1924).
' Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928), no
recovery was allowed against a defendant railroad whose guard, in pushing
passengers into a train, caused a package containing fireworks to .fall from
the arms of one of the passengers; they exploded upon striking the ground,
and the concussion dislodged a pair of scales some distance down the platform;
the plaintiff, standing near the scales, was struck by them.
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Company in particular, permitted their own cars to be used by em-
ployees for their own personal business. Months later, said defendant
gave to its employee, one Juan Lord, permission to use said car for
his own personal purpose and while the car was thus under Lord's
care the plaintiff's intestate was struck and killed. The sole pro-
ducing cause of the accident was Lord's negligent operation of the
vehicle. Plaintiff, in an action for wrongful death, seeks to hold
Forbes Inc., liable under the Vehicle and Traffic Law, Section 59.1
The Appellate Division dismissed the complaint against the Forbes
Agency finding conversion by the defendant Brown and Kleinhenz
Inc., in that the car was used in an unauthorized manner so that the
statute no longer applied to the'situation. On appeal, held, judgment
of the Appellate Division reversed and that of the Trial Term, in
favor of the plaintiff, affirmed. Since it was a question of fact whether
Forbes' consent to the use of the car as made by the Brown Agency
could be implied from all the facts and circumstances, the jury's find-
ing on this point should not have been disturbed as a matter of law.
Jackson v. Brown and Kleinhenz Inc., 273 N. Y. 365, 7 N. E. (2d)
265 (1937).
At common law mere ownership of a motor vehicle did not ren-
der the owner liable for its negligent operation by another not stand-
ing in the relation of agent or servant to him and over whom he had
no control.2 Thus, the owner was not liable for an injury occasioned
by one negligently operating the vehicle, as an independent contrac-
tor, or, as in this case, a bailee using the car exclusively for his own
benefit.8
However, by statute,4 our legislature has modified the common
law rule so that today the owner's liability has been extended so as
to include liability for death or injuries, to person or property, while
his car is being negligently operated by another with his permission,
express or implied, and this regardless of whether the car is being
used in the owner's behalf or solely for the benefit of the borrower. 5
While the law holds the owner free of any liability when his per-
mission to use the car, express or implied, cannot be established 6 or
where once established it also develops that the borrower, not being
:'VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 59: "Every owner of a motor vehicle oper-
ated upon a public highway shall be liable for deaths or injuries to a person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such vehicle * * * in
the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person operating same with
the permission, express or implied, of such owner."
2 Cunningham v. Castle, 127 App. Div. 580, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1057 (1st
Dept. 1908) ; Towers v. Errington, 78 Misc. 297, 138 N. Y. Supp. 119 (1912).
'Blaircom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. 111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917); Doersam v.
Isenburg, 205 App. Div. 447, 199 N. Y. Supp. 569 (4th Dept. 1923) ; Brooks v.
McNutt Auto Del. Co., Inc., 126 Misc. 730, 214 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1926) ; James
Butler, Inc. v. Jackson, 126 Misc. 568, 214 N. Y. Supp. 23 (1926).
' See note 1, supra.
'Cohen v. Neustadter, 247 N. Y. 207, 160 N. E. 12 (1928).
'Fleugal v. Coudert, 244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 683 (1927).
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faithful to the trust imposed upon him by the owner, converts the car
by going beyond the scope of the permission granted,7 yet the law is
firm and settled in instances such as this: where all the elements
necessary to hold the owner liable are present; and where a liberal
construction of the implied permission clause of the statute will result
in the fulfillment of the legislator's aims by placing the responsibility
upon the owner of the vehicle. Although the statute is to be limited
to those cases which fairly fall within the scope of its language, it
must be given a construction which will result in the fulfillment of
the purpose for which it was enacted.8
The border line between the implication of the owner's implied
permission from the circumstances surrounding the changing of con-
trol over the vehicle, and the finding of a conversion on the other
hand, thus relieving the owner of liability, is often so narrow that the
danger in giving Section 59 a too narrow construction in regard to
the implied permission clause becomes obvious.
There were sufficient facts surrounding the whole situation to
warrant the jury's finding and to deny them the right to so find was
error which the Court of Appeals was quick to remedy.9
L.I.
NEGLIGENCE-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-JOINT ENTERPRISE
-LIABILITY OF PUBLIC SERVANT FOR NEGLIGENT DEATH OF FELLOW
EMPLOYEE.-Plaintiff's intestate, a volunteer fireman, while riding on
a fire truck driven by defendant, also a fireman, was killed due to
latter's negligence. A judgment recovered against the village of Rock-
ville Centre and the driver was reversed on the ground that the
municipality was not liable.' On a reargument of the appeal as to
the liability of the individual defendant, the Appellate Division dis-
missed the complaint holding that the intestate and the defendant,
being employed in a public service, were engaged in a joint enterprise
and each assumed the risk arising out of their relationship. On ap-
peal, held, reversed. Individuals engaged in a public service are per-
sonally liable for their negligence resulting in injury to fellow em-
ployees. Ottmann v. Village of Rockville Centre, 275 N. Y. 270,
9 N. E. (2d) 862 (1937).*
"Nee v. Slaboda, 270 N. Y. 571, 1 N. E. (2d) 335 (1936).
' Rolfe v. Hewitt, 227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920) ; Fleugal v. Coudert,
244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 683 (1927); Katz v. Wolfe, 129 Misc. 384, 221 N. Y.
Supp. 476 (1927).0 Jorgenson v. Jaegers, 257 N. Y. 171, 177 N. E. 410 (1931) ; Zuckerman v.
Parton, 260 N. Y. 446, 184 N. E. 49 (1933).
* It should be noted that the sections of the General Municipal Law cited
were enacted after this cause of action arose and are not controlling in this
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